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1.  Introduction 
Given their central role in corporate governance, boards of directors have become a popular 
topic of research. Indeed, a recent search of ssrn.com for “board of directors” yielded a total of 2009 
research papers on the topic.
2 A major difficulty in designing research about boards of directors is that the 
day-to-day workings of a boardroom are private, so that to understand the roles of boards, researchers 
must draw (possibly incorrect) inferences about their decision-making process from publicly observable 
data. The most common empirical research strategy on boards is to gather data on the structure of boards 
and to draw inferences about what boards do from the way in which this structure affects observable 
variables  about  the  firm.  Theoretical  research  generally  starts  from  premises  about  what  kinds  of 
decisions boards make (managerial or supervisory) and the process by which these decisions are made. 
The  uncertainty  about  the  extent  to  which  the  empirical  inferences  are  correct,  and  to  which  the 
underlying assumptions of the theoretical models characterize real-world boards limits the applicability of 
this research. 
In this paper, we supplement existing research, which is primarily based on publicly available 
data, with private data on the detailed minutes of board meetings. These minutes document the details of 
board and board committee meetings, including all the statements made by every participant in each 
meeting.
3  We  obtain  minutes  for  eleven  Israeli  business  companies  in  which  the  government  has  a 
substantial equity interest (GBCs), each covering a year of meetings within the 2007-2009 period. We 
transform the minutes into a quantitative database that characterizes the board meetings, allowing us to 
assess the way in which the boards work and interact with management. For each issue discussed, we 
document what was discussed, whether an update was delivered or alternatively a decision was made by 
the board, whether there was any dissention at the voting phase, whether the decision followed the CEO’s 
recommendation, whether the board took an initiative to modify or define more broadly the actions to be 
taken, whether the board requested to receive further information or an update, and whether the board was 
                                                  
2 The search was done on August 29, 2011. 
3 These minutes are complete and were not censored for sensitive information.   2
presented with at least two proposals to consider. This database consists of the minutes from 155 board 
meetings and 247 board-committee meetings, in which 2459 decisions were made or updates were given 
(1422 decisions and 1037 updates).
4 
This paper is the first to analyze board minutes in a systematic fashion. Doing so has a number of 
advantages  over  traditional  empirical  work  that  employs  publicly  available  or  interview-based  data. 
Outcome-based empirical work typically relates board composition to observables such as CEO turnover, 
a hostile takeover, or adoption of a poison pill.
5 These events, albeit extremely important, are unusual and 
do not reflect the day-to-day functions of boards. In addition, there are a number of studies relying on 
interviews with CEOs and directors, with the goal of capturing the essence of the way in which they work 
together.
6 Yet, these studies rely on directors’ memories and willingness to disclose their own actions, and 
can therefore reflect inflated perceptions of directors regarding their own abilities and their contribution to 
the firm. The advantage of the minutes is that they record everything that happened at the meetings, and 
provide a clear picture of what boards actually do.  
A fundamental problem in the literature on boards of directors is that it has not agreed on the 
process by which boards govern the firm. Some models, including Song and Thakor (2006), Adams and 
Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008), adopt a “managerial” approach to boards of directors, and 
presume that boards make managerial decisions such as which projects to take, which employees to hire, 
etc. An alternative, “supervisory” approach, adopted by models such as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), 
Almazan and Suarez (2003), and Raheja (2005), starts from the assumption that the main function of 
boards is to monitor and assess the CEO, rather than to intervene in particular issues. The minutes data 
allows us to do the somewhat unorthodox testing of the basic assumptions made in each of the two 
approaches, in addition to testing their predictions. 
                                                  
4The minutes of meetings total 4,758 pages. The average number of pages of minutes per board meeting is 14.2; for 
board-committee meetings it is 10.5.  
5 See Weisbach (1988), Shivdasani (1993) and Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994). 
6 See Mace (1971), Lorsch and McIver (1989) and Adams (2009).   3
For the sample of GBCs we consider, boards appear to play is their supervisory role the majority 
of the time: 67% of the issues discussed by the boards in our sample we classified as supervisory. Also 
consistent with the supervisory approach is the fact that most of the time, boards go along with the CEO’s 
wishes – at the voting phase, in only 2.5% of the cases did boards partially or completely disagree with the 
CEO. In addition, we find that in only one percent of the time was the board presented with more than one 
alternative to choose from. 
However,  we  also  document  evidence  suggesting  that  some  of  the  time  boards  do  play  a 
managerial role.  On average, in 8.1% of the issues discussed the board took an initiative on its own, 
implying that it actively participated in shaping the decision in these cases. In addition, in 8% of the issues 
the board requested to receive further information or an update. Since a number of issues are discussed at 
every meeting, boards played an active role on at least one issue in the majority of meetings.  In 63% of 
the meetings, boards took at least one of the following actions: they did not vote in line with the CEO, they 
requested to receive further information or an update, or took an initiative as. These findings suggest that 
boards can be described as active monitors. Most commonly, they supervise and monitor management; 
however, on occasion they are called upon to make managerial decisions themselves.  
We also examine the extent of dissension among directors. We find that at the firm level, in 
3.3% of the cases boards did not vote unanimously. These findings suggest that modeling boards as a 
monolithic entity is a reasonable approach, and is also consistent with models that predict that boards will 
usually vote unanimously. 
The minutes data allows us to draw some inferences that are impossible to make using publicly 
available  data.  For  example,  our  sample  suggests  that  prior  work  understates  the  fraction  of  CEO 
departures  that  are  “forced”.  While  our  sample  is  too  small  to  draw  reliable  estimates  of  the 
understatement, there are at least two cases in our sample where the CEO was clearly coerced to leave by 
the board, yet there would be no way to know about this coercion using only publicly available data. The 
existence of these cases suggest that estimates of the fraction of CEO turnovers that are forced using   4
publicly-traded data will underestimate perhaps substantially, the fraction of turnovers that are initiated by 
the board. 
A potential concern is the extent to which the boards of our sample of Israeli government-
controlled companies reflect other companies. While it is impossible to know exactly how different our 
firms’ governance is from that of privately held companies in both in Israel and the rest of the world, there 
are  several  relevant  factors  to  consider.    Because  the  GBCs  are  government-controlled,  directors  are 
appointed  and  not  elected  by  shareholders,  and  therefore  do  not  have  direct  pecuniary  incentives  to 
maximize their firms’ values. However, the GBC boards we consider are of similar size and composition 
as  boards  of  publicly  traded  companies  around  the  world,  especially  those  in  Israel  and  Europe.  In 
addition, like directors of privately-held companies, these directors still have a fiduciary responsibility to 
maximize their firm’s profits, and our reading of the minutes suggests that they take this responsibility 
seriously. Furthermore, as we specify throughout the paper, the board dynamics we document are similar 
to  those  reported  in  interview-based  studies,  which  are  most  often  based  on  publicly-traded  U.S. 
companies. For these reasons, we believe that the relationship between a CEO and a GBC board, and 
among  the  directors  of  GBCs,  is  likely  to  be  similar  to  the  corresponding  relationships  in  other 
boardrooms.  
To understand the role of boards of directors, we believe it is necessary to observe to the extent 
possible how they actually function. To do so requires the kind of data for which we have access for our 
sample, but is impossible to obtain for most firms. The fact that models of boards of directors proceed 
from such wildly different underlying assumptions suggests that this approach has value and can lead to 
improved modeling and interpretation of empirical results of other studies. Our hope is that by opening up 
the “black box” of the board for these companies, we can shed light on how boards function in other types 
of companies in which the basic structure of a board supervising a CEO is present. 
 
2.  Business Firms in which the Israeli Government Holds Shares   5
This study examines the minutes of board and board-committee meetings of eleven business companies in 
which the Israeli government holds shares; we refer to them as GBCs (government business companies). 
These eleven companies are taken from the thirty-four GBCs that operate in Israel in various fields, 
including infrastructure, military technology, construction/housing, and services. All GBCs are overseen 
by the Government Companies Authority, which represents the government in its role as a shareholder. 
Table  1  presents  2007  key  figures  for  the  universe  of  the  thirty-four  GBCs.  As  this  table 
indicates, the size of these companies varies greatly: some companies employ only tens of employees, 
whereas others employ more than ten thousand. The annual income of the smaller GBCs is just a few 
million USD, whereas the comparable figure for the larger firms is one to four billion USD. The latter 
firms are very large relative to other Israeli firms.
7  
Israel’s 1999 “Corporation Law” which applies to all corporate companies in Israel (including 
government  owned  firms),  and  its  1975  “Government  Companies  Law”  which  applies  only  to 
government owned firms, detail the duties incumbent upon their boards. Both laws stress that the board 
must determine the company’s policy. In addition, both laws stress that the board must monitor the CEO. 
Concerning  “business  companies”,  which  are  the  firms  examined  in  this  study,  the  Government 
Companies Law explicitly requires that “the firm operate according to business considerations just as 
firms with no government shareholder do” (authors’ translation). 
Furthermore,  the  GCL  specifies  additional  tasks  the  board  must  carry  out  which  include 
determining the company’s budget, discussing the financial reports, determining the long-term program, 
and choosing and appointing the CEO. The GCL also states that the CEO is not permitted to serve as the 
chairman of the board (and he is also not permitted to serve as a director of the firm of which he is the 
                                                  
7 The median income of 662 companies that were traded at the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange in 2007, and for which 
data is available, was 36 million USD; the average figure was 265 million USD. In 2007, only six companies traded 
on the TASE had income that exceeded that of the Israel Electricity Company, the largest government company in 
Israel.    6
CEO). However, it is clear from the minutes that the CEO is present in virtually all meetings of the board 
and its committees.
8 
2.1. Boards of Directors of GBCs 
All GBCs examined have one-tier boards. Usually the by-laws of each GBC require that the board be 
made up of six to twelve directors, with seven to ten being most common in practice. The by-laws of each 
of the companies also specify which ministers appoint the directors of the company; in most cases it is the 
Minister of Finance and one additional relevant minister. In certain cases, the by-laws state that some of 
the directors must be employees of the ministries, and/or representatives of the company’s employees, but 
in no case can more than two of the latter sit on a board. The 1975 “Government Companies Law” 
imposes restrictions on nominating politicians to GBC boards, and the nomination committee strictly 
enforces these restrictions. Hence, although the directors nominated must be somehow connected to the 
ministers, virtually no politicians were nominated to the firms examined.  
Directors of GBCs are appointed by the government, and in practice, their re-nomination does 
not depend on their individual, or the firm’s performance.
9 The only compensation given to directors is a 
fixed compensation for each board or board-committee meeting they attend, a compensation which ranges 
between $185 and $350 per meeting,
10 with the exact quantity a function of the company’s size.
11  
Summary statistics on the directors of the GBCs examined are presented in Table 2, alongside 
comparative data pertaining to boards of directors of publicly-traded firms from four different countries: 
                                                  
8 All GBCs have finance and audit board committees. In addition, most GBCs have approximately two to three 
additional board committees. 
9 In addition, The Government Companies Law requires that in companies in which the government holds more than 
half the votes in the general stockholders’ meetings, directors must be at least twenty-five years old, be residents of 
Israel, and either have degrees in business, economics, law, accounting, engineering, public service, or any other 
field relevant to the firm, or have at least five years of relevant experience or experience in a senior management 
position. The requirements regarding the chairman are even stricter.  
10 Although this financial compensation is not high, there are always candidates interested in being directors of 
GBCs,  since  such  positions  provide  status,  the  expansion  of  one’s  professional  network,  and  also  enable  the 
development of an expertise in demand in the better-paying private sector. 
11 In small and medium companies, the chairman is not employed on a full-time basis, and his compensation is based 
on the number of meetings he actually attends. In large companies, the chairman is employed on a full-time basis, 
and accordingly receives (only) a monthly salary. State employees or company employees receive no additional 
remuneration for serving as directors.   7
Israel, Norway, Switzerland, and the U.S. Table 2 documents that publicly-traded firms from different 
countries tend to have directors with somewhat different backgrounds from one another, but that GBC 
boards do not differ dramatically from those of publicly-traded companies. More specifically, the GBC 
directors are only a few years younger than their counterparts serving on the other companies’ boards, and 
they are more likely to have a BA, but less likely to have an MA/ MBA. The percentage of GBC directors 
with executive experience is similar to that of their Norwegian and American counterparts. 
 
3.  Data and Methods 
Minutes of board-meetings and board-committee meetings of eleven GBCs were coded for a period of 
one calendar year for each company. The year studied was between the years 2007 and 2009 (2008 for 8 
of 11 companies). These minutes document the occurrences of these meeting, including what each of the 
attendees said at the meetings. Nine of the eleven companies examined provided minutes of both board 
meetings and board-committees, while the other two supplied only minutes from their board meetings.  
Confidentiality agreements preclude identification of the specific firms in the sample. However, 
all eleven firms are among those listed in Table 1. They are of different size, as measured by annual 
income, with a tendency toward the larger GBCs, and tend to reflect the different fields in which the 
GBCs operate. Of the eleven firms, nine were completely owned by the Israeli government, the other two 
only partially (approximately 50% of the shares were held by the government). 
An important limitation of these data is that they do not contain information on what occurs 
between the CEO and the directors outside the boardroom. Undoubtedly, important interactions take place 
outside the boardroom, but unless they are mentioned in the minutes, it is not possible for us to be aware 
of them. Nevertheless, although there are discussions and interactions outside the boardroom, the bulk of 
board activity – including the decision-making process – takes place in the boardroom and so is reflected 
in the minutes.  
The data was coded according to content-analysis methodology (Krippendorff, 2004; Lieblich 
et al., 1998). The content analysis methodology is a “systematic replicable technique for comprising many   8
words of text into fewer content categories, based on explicit rules of coding” (Stemler, 2001). This 
methodology involves constructing a quantitative database by categorizing or coding different aspects of 
a qualitative data set. We did all coding manually, because the coding guidelines we define require a 
comprehensive understanding of the content of the meetings. The essentials of the coding guidelines are 
as follows (for a more detailed discussion, see the appendix): 
i.  General information. For each update or decision, we recorded the name of the company, date of 
meeting, number of pages and type of meeting (board/committee), and whether the issue was merely 
presented as an update or, alternatively, culminated in a decision made by the board. 
ii.  Aggregate  topic-subjects.  Each  topic  discussed  or  decision  made  in  a  board  meeting  or  board-
committee meeting was coded under one of the following five aggregate topic-subjects: audit and 
contracting, business issues, financial issues, formal issues, and personnel and benefits. 
iii.  Topic-subjects. The five aggregate topic-subjects were further broken down to twenty-three topic-
subjects, as presented in Table 8. 
iv.  Decision in line with CEO. For each decision made by the board, the decision was coded as either in 
line, partially in line, or not in line with the CEO’s/ management’s proposal. 
v.  Further updates. Cases in which the board requested to receive further information or an update on 
the subject discussed. 
vi.  Taking an initiative. When a board actively did something that was meant to improve the company, 
according to its own understanding, this was coded either as a “minor initiative” or as a “major 
initiative.” “Minor initiative” indicates that the board slightly modified the original proposal. For 
example:  The  board  approved  a  lease  it  was  asked  to  approve,  yet  decided  to  introduce  a  few 
revisions of details. “Major initiative”, indicates that the board took an active part in defining the 
steps/ actions that should be taken. For example: The board was either presented an issue and delved 
into  it  or  actively  requested  an  issue  be  discussed,  discussed  it  quite  thoroughly,  and  finally, 
formulated and adopted a new alternative policy.  
vii.  Presentation of alternatives. Cases in which the board was presented with at least two alternatives.    9
viii.  Dissension. Cases in which a decision was made, and one or more of the directors did not vote as the 
others (either opposing them or abstaining).  
ix.  Supervision. All topic-subjects were divided according to whether they were of supervisory nature or 
not.  Supervisory  topic-subjects  were  defined  as:  appointment  of  members,  approving  minutes  of 
earlier meetings, audit, choosing a chairman for the meeting, contracting/ purchases, financial reports, 
formal issues, legal, personnel and benefits, ratification of audit committee, ratification of human 
resources committee, ratification of operational committee, ratification of financial committee, and 
regulation and government. Non-supervisory topic-subjects were defined as: appointing/ firing an 
executive, budget, business issue, business project, cross-firm issues, investment/ finance, ongoing 
general issues, organizational change, and strategic issues. 
x.  Consistency. All coding was done by one of the authors: Miriam Schwartz-Ziv. To assure consistent 
standards, she reviewed all coding at least twice. 
 
4.  What Can We Learn from Board Minutes about Theories of Boards?  
Most empirical research on boards of directors relies on publicly observable outcomes, such as 
CEO turnover, firm performance, adoption of a poison pill, etc.
12 In contrast, minutes of board meetings 
tell us what actually is discussed on boardrooms. As such, relying on minutes has a number of advantages 
over traditional research on boards. In particular, this approach allows us to observe the involvement of 
boards and the extent they are active, and consequently to understand which underlying assumptions and 
predictions concerning boards are most realistic. Perhaps because the underlying process by which boards 
actually  make  decisions  is  unknown,  the  literature  has  adopted  a  number  of  alternative  underlying 
assumptions when modeling boards.  
Table 3 maps assumptions and predictions made in some of the more central models concerning 
boards. This table indicates that there are two main approaches to studying board dynamics. The first, 
                                                  
12 See Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) or Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) for surveys with detail on the 
individual studies.   10
which  we  call  the  “managerial”  approach,  starts  from  the  presumption  that  boards  make  managerial 
decisions. In these models, boards typically choose among a number of potential projects that the firm can 
undertake. For example, in Adams and Ferreira (2007) the board is presented with alternative potential 
projects, from which it chooses one, in Baranchuk and Dybvig (2009) the board chooses an optimal action 
from a set of possible actions, while in Harris and Raviv (2008), the board chooses the optimal scale of an 
investment.  Because  in  these  models,  the  CEO  and  the  directors  have  different  utility  functions,  in 
equilibrium  there  is  generally  disagreement  between  the  CEO  and  the  directors.  Panel  1  of  Table  3 
provides further information on the settings and predictions of these and other models that utilize the 
managerial approach. 
In contrast to the managerial approach, the “supervisory” approach presumes that the board’s 
role is to evaluate management rather than to make decisions themselves. The general setup of these 
models  consists  of  the  CEO  proposing  a  project,  the  board  observing  the  earnings  derived  from  it, 
assessing the CEO’s performance and deciding whether to retain him. These models assume that the 
board’s work consists of supervising the CEO and evaluating his performance on a regular basis, and 
potentially replacing him, rather than being involved in the day-to-day decisions of the firm. In the 
supervisory-approach  models,  apart  from  acquiring  signals  pertaining  to  the  quality  of  the  CEO, 
evaluating management is typically the only action the board takes. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), 
Almazan and Suarez (2003), Graziano and Luporini (2003), Raheja (2005), Dominguez-Martinez et al. 
(2008), and Chemmanur and Fedaseyeu (2011) all adopt variants of this supervisory approach. Panel 2 of 
Table 3 characterizes these and other models based on the supervisory approach. We use the minutes at 
our disposal to assess the extent to which the assumptions and predictions made in each of the two 
approaches characterize real-world boardrooms. 
 
5.  The Supervisory Approach to Boards of Directors 
In this section we present the evidence evaluating whether boards of directors’ activities are characterized 
by the supervisory approach.  In particular, to what extent does the board’s work consists of supervising   11
the CEO and evaluating his performance, and potentially replacing him, as opposed to being involved in 
the day-to-day decisions of the firm? 
5.1. What Kind of Issues do Boards Discuss? 
We classify each of the 23 topic-subjects as either supervisory or managerial. Managerial issues include 
the  type  of  issues  for  which  boards  are  expected  (by  law,  for  example)  to  be  active.  Therefore, 
managerial issues include the topic-subjects that pertain to business issues and firing and hiring the CEO. 
In contrast, the supervisory issues include the issues boards are expected to supervise, but generally, not 
do to do the actual work. For example, approving a financial report is classified as supervisory because 
the board’s role with regard to these reports is mainly verifying that they are properly conducted, rather 
than creating these reports.
13 
Table 4 indicates that, weighted by firm, on average 67% of the issues discussed by the boards 
were  classified  as  supervisory,  and  Table  5  documents  that  weighted  by  issue  discussed,  the 
corresponding ratio equals 69%. For board-committee  meetings, this figure increases to 79%. These 
figures indicate that the majority of time spent at board and board committee meetings is dedicated to 
discussing supervisory issues.
14 
In addition, a large part of board meetings is devoted to updates, which include discussions that 
do not involve a decision being made. Table 4 indicates that weighting by firm, 61% of the issues boards 
discussed were updates that did not involve making a decision. Table 6 presents a breakdown of the 
aggregate  number  of  decisions  made  and  updates  supplied  on  a  topic-subject  level.  This  panel 
reemphasizes that receiving updates was more common than making decisions: the boards examined 
received,  aggregately,  1422  updates,  while  they  made  only  1037  decisions  (i.e.,  58%  versus  42% 
                                                  
13 Supervisory topic-subjects were defined as: appointment of members, approving minutes of earlier meeting, audit, 
choosing a chairman for the meeting, contracting/ purchases, financial reports, formal issues, legal, personnel and 
benefits,  ratification  of  audit  committee,  ratification  of  human  resources  committee,  ratification  of  operational 
committee,  ratification  of  financial  committee,  and  regulation  and  government.  Managerial  topic-subjects  were 
defined as: appointing/ firing an executive, budget, business issue, business project, cross-firm issues, investment/ 
finance, ongoing general issues, organizational change, and strategic issues. 
14 It is not the case, however, that all issues are equally important, so it is possible that even though they spend more 
time on supervisory issues, the managerial ones could conceivably be more important.   12
respectively). The relative high frequency of updates probably allowed boards to stay abreast of the 
firm’s affairs, i.e., to monitor and supervise.  
These findings suggest that a majority of the time, boards mostly discuss supervisory issues and 
receive frequent updates are consistent with interview-based studies such as Mace (1971), Lorsch and 
MacIver  (1989)  and  Carter  and  Lorsch  (2003).  Relatedly,  Adams  (2003)  examines  the  portion  of 
compensation paid to boards of Fortune 500 companies is linked to each of the committees. She finds 
that most of the compensation boards receive that can be linked to a specific committee is for monitoring 
tasks. Adams interprets this finding similarly to the way we do, that boards devote effort primarily to 
monitoring. Taken together, our findings provide support that the most common task of the boards is 
monitoring of management as is presumed by the supervisory approach. 
In addition to monitoring, boards also potentially play a managerial role in firms by being 
involved in the actual business, as implied by the managerial approach. We consider the extent to which 
they do so in our sample.
15 Table 6 indicates that they do perform a managerial role, but it is clearly a 
minority of their time; on the aggregate topic-subject level, only 24% of the discussions pertained to 
business issues. Furthermore, only 1% of the issues discussed pertained to issues of strategy (not reported 
in Table 6). These findings stress that the boards rarely had formal and structured discussions of the 
firm’s overall strategy, or even of the firm’s strategy regarding a specific major issue/field. Furthermore, 
as Table 6 indicates, on the aggregate topic-subject level, in 67% of the cases in which boards discussed 
business issues they were provided with updates; only in the remaining 33% did they make decisions on 
these issues.
16  
The following example from the minutes illustrates a typical case boards involvement in a 
major business decision. A firm encountered a situation in which it was forced to stop working with one 
                                                  
15 The GBCs we examine were obligated to verify the financial reports, handle personnel issues, handle audit issues, 
and like US firms at that time, were taking initial steps to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Law (SOX). The GBCs 
were required by the GCA to comply with SOX; however executives of GBCs did not face the severe penalties their 
American counterparts faced if they did comply with SOX as required.  
16 We emphasize that we cannot tell from the minutes value of the time spent on different issue and it is possible that 
the time spent on managerial issues could be more important to the firm than the time spent on supervisory ones.     13
of its major strategic partners, and was compelled to find a new strategic partner. The CEO of this firm 
regularly updated the board on the different strategic partners he was negotiating with. When the time 
came to choose the new strategic partner, the CEO made the decision. He explained to the board why he 
chose to collaborate with the chosen strategic partner, i.e., his decision was delivered to the board as an 
update, and was not even formally approved by the board. The only decision the board was requested to 
make in this case was to approve the legal papers, which were presented to the board two meetings after 
the CEO announced his decision. 
5.2. Are Boards given an Opportunity to Choose among Options?  
Some of the managerial models assume that the boards choose one of several proposed alternatives. For 
example,  in  Adams  and  Ferreira  (2007)  the  board  chooses  an  optimal  project  out  of  two  or  more 
alternatives and in Baranchuk and Dybvig (2009) the board chooses to take an action from a set of 
possible  actions.  In  contrast,  the  supervisory  models  do  not  assume  that  boards  are  presented  with 
alternatives. For example, Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2010) assume that the most boards can do is to 
approve or to reject a specific proposal made by the management. Because most other supervisory models 
surveyed in Panel 2 of Table 3 do not allow boards to make decisions concerning the firm’s operations 
(apart from choosing and firing the CEO), these models do not consider the possibility that boards are 
presented with alternatives. We examine the different assumptions made in each of the approaches, i.e., 
whether CEOs tend to present to their boards two or more alternatives. 
Table 4 indicates that, at the firm level, in only 1% of the cases in which decisions were made 
was the board presented with more than one option, with firm-specific averages ranging from 0%-4.55%. 
Almost always, boards could only accept or reject a single proposal. 
Although  the  minutes  document  explicit  requests  of  directors  that  they  be  presented  with 
alternatives, the same directors making these requests usually wanted the alternatives to be presented with 
a clear recommendation as to which alternative the CEO/ management preferred. One relatively rare case 
in which the board was asked to choose between specific alternatives concerned specific assumptions that 
had  to  be  made  in  the  firm’s  financial  reports.  These  assumptions  impacted  the  financial  reports   14
dramatically. Different parties involved (internal and external to the firm) disagreed upon the correct set of 
assumptions  and,  consequently,  the  board  was  requested  to  approve  one  of  two  different  sets  of 
assumptions presented to them. The directors refused to make a decision, instead demanding that the 
parties involved agree upon one set of assumptions – which would thereafter be presented to the board for 
approval. Only after this dispute continued for several months, and the board was left with no choice but to 
take a stand, did it eventually take one.  
5.3. Disagreement between the Board and the CEO 
Managerial-approach models typically suggest that boards may select projects that may well not be in line 
with the CEO’s wishes. Thus, for example, in Adams and Ferreira (2007) the board and the manager have 
different utility functions, implying that the boards’ preferred project could be different than that of the 
CEO. Adams and Ferreira consider monitoring to be successful if the board can impose its preferred 
project. Similarly, Harris and Raviv (2008) model the way in which the board determines the optimal 
scale of the investment for a project, which can differ from the scale of the original proposal. Hence, both 
Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) predict that the board will, in practice, make 
decisions that are not in line with the original proposals made by the CEO.  
In contrast, the supervisory-approach models do not predict that disagreement will be common. 
For example, Warther (1998), who takes in account the costly outcomes that dissension may have for 
directors who deviate from their colleagues’ vote, predicts that in most cases the board will vote in favor 
of management. In monitoring models such as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Graziano and Luporini 
(2003),  Dominguez-Martinez  et  al.  (2008),  and  Chemmanur  and  Fedaseyeu  (2011),  the  board  is  not 
involved in any managerial decisions. Rather, its activity is limited to choosing between retaining the 
CEO and firing the CEO. Because the board does not interfere in running the business, disagreement 
between the board and the CEO is not expected to occur.  
In our sample, consistent with the supervisory models, boards almost always approved what 
they were asked to approve. In only 0.9% of the cases did the boards vote against the CEO/management’s 
view, and in only an additional 1.5% of the cases was their vote only partially in line with the CEO’s/   15
management’s view. Thus, as Table 4 and Table 7 document, only in one of forty cases (2.5%) did boards 
refuse,  completely  or  partially,  to  ratify  the  CEO’s  proposal.
17  Moreover,  as  Table  7  indicates,  the 
percentage  of  cases  in  which  boards  totally  or  partially  rejected  the  CEO’s  proposal  with  regard  to 
business issues equaled only 1% (as opposed, for example, to personnel and benefits issues, for which the 
rejection rate equaled 4.5%); In other words, rejection rates for business issues are even lower than the 
average rejection rate of all cases examined.  
The following example from our sample demonstrates how “seeds of disagreement” may or 
may not evolve to a vote which is not in line with the CEO’s initial proposal: In two different boardrooms 
the CEO requested that the board approve the annual budget he proposed. In both cases the board was of 
the opinion that the budget should be cut substantially. In the first firm, the board demanded that the CEO 
put together a different budget in which large cuts be made, some of which were specifically discussed in 
the boardroom. In this case the board did not vote in line with the CEO’s proposal. In contrast, in the 
second firm, the CEO responded to the demand that he cut the proposed budget by stating that he viewed 
the board’s intervention in the annual budget as verging upon a vote of no confidence in him. This tactic 
worked for this CEO, and the meeting commenced with the board approving the budget he proposed. 
This example also demonstrates that boards may disagree with the CEO during the pre-voting phase, 
however, at the voting phase, which is the phase the coding pertaining to the board’s votes captures, the 
board may nevertheless vote in line with the CEO. 
The low frequency of disagreement documented in this study highlights that, at latest, by the 
voting phase boards will prefer to resolve their disagreements with the CEO. The findings also imply that 
the prediction made in Song and Thakor (2006), Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) 
– that boards will in practice vote against the CEO’s proposal – occurs only to a limited extent. Our 
results  are  consistent  with  Warther’s  (1998)  prediction  that  boards  will  usually  vote  in  favor  of 
management’s  proposal.  This  low  frequency  of  disagreement  suggests  that  proceeding  from  the 
                                                  
17 In GBCs the CEO may not be nominated to the board of the company of which he is a CEO. Hence, the CEO does 
not vote, and the disagreement ratios mentioned include only the votes of the directors.    16
assumption that the CEO will be the one making decisions in practice is a reasonable approach (see 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Graziano and Luporini, 2003; and Dominguez-Martinez et al., 2008). It 
appears that once the board has chosen a CEO – and that is indeed a major decision entrusted to the board 
– the CEO will be the one making the firm’s major decisions. 
In addition, these findings are in line with prior interview-based studies on large publicly-
traded corporations: Mace (1971) concludes that boards do not usually ask discerning questions, or in the 
terms of Patton and Baker (1987), that they “refuse to rock the boat”. Similarly, Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) report that in their sample, directors almost always attempt to avoid confrontation with the CEO. 
The similarity between these findings from publicly-traded companies with ours suggests the description 
of board behavior from these GBC Israeli companies is not specific to government-run companies, but 
instead characterizes board behavior more generally.   
5.4. Firings of Top Management 
According to most of the models we categorized under the supervisory approach, the goal of monitoring 
management is to evaluate the CEO, and if warranted, replace him. The data on board minutes is different 
from the typical study of CEO turnover in that there are many fewer turnovers in this sample than in a 
large sample of firms over a number of years. Since we examine only eleven firms (each for one year), 
and the median CEO turnover rate for all GBCs is 3.14 years,
18 the expected number of turnovers for the 
eleven firms examined is approximately four. Indeed, four of the firms examined, replaced, or were in the 
process of replacing their CEO during the year for which the minutes were examined. 
The advantage of having the data on board minutes is that, unlike with large samples that are 
based only on public information, in our case it is possible to know with certainty whether a CEO was 
fired or left voluntarily, and details of the process by which he left. Knowing such details potentially 
sheds light on the way in which boards monitor, and highlights, once again, the advantage of the data we 
have. To further highlight this point, consider the following CEO forced turnover rates reported in prior 
                                                  
18 Figure calculated by the authors based on data pertaining to all GBCs, for the years 1997-2007, taken from an 
internal database of the Government Companies Authority.   17
reports/ studies: Spencer Stuart (2004), reports this rate equals 4% for S&P 500 firms based on the press 
releases of the company from which the CEO departed; Huson et al. (2004) report a 16% rate for large 
public firms based on data from the Wall Street Journal; and Taylor (2010) reports an observed forced 
CEO turnover rate equal to 17% using a similar approach to Huson et al. (2004).
19 
  In our sample, at least two of four departures may have appeared to be voluntary, but in fact were 
coerced.
20 Consider the following example: A young CEO was very successful in launching new projects 
and finding funding for them, but less successful in managing the daily operation of the firm and in 
maintaining employee relations. The operational indicators, which were reported to the board on an 
ongoing basis, deteriorated to such an extent that the CEO stopped reporting them to the board. After 
many months, the board agreed (among themselves) that the serving CEO was not the optimal one. Some 
of the directors communicated this conclusion to the CEO on several occasions. The CEO, realizing he 
was no long longer welcome, sought and found a rewarding executive position in a different firm. The 
only information that surfaced to the media was a standard announcement to the effect that the CEO has 
decided to accept a new position, and that the firm thanks him for his significant contribution. This issue 
highlights that there are important gaps between what one can infer from publicly available information 
and the way in which things actually occur. The existence of coerced departures such as this one suggests 
that prior studies potentially undercount the fraction of CEO departures for which the board takes an 
active role in removing the CEO. 
 
6.  The Managerial Approach to Boards of Directors 
In contrast to the supervisory view of boards, the managerial approach predicts that boards will be active 
decision-makers. In this section we present the evidence from our sample that supports the managerial 
approach.  
                                                  
19In contrast, Cornelli et al. (2010) examine mostly private equity backed firms, categorize forced turnover based on 
information obtained from private equity partners, rather than the media. They document a forced CEO turnover rate 
of 94% (11/181). However, private-equity backed firms are substantially different from other firms in that many 
private equity partnerships purchase firms with the explicit intention of replacing the CEO. 
20The descriptions of these examples are based on short interviews with directors at the firms involved.   18
6.1. Active Decision-Making 
The managerial approach presumes the board plays an active role in the firm that goes beyond simply 
monitoring managers.  In particular, it can affect the projects the firm undertakes (e.g., Song and Thakor, 
2006) or the scale of investments it chooses (Harris and Raviv, 2008). As Adams and Ferreira (2007) and 
Malenko (2011) stress, ongoing communication between the board and the CEO allows the board to 
monitor on the one hand, and make optimal decisions on the other. This approach assumes boards are 
active decision-makers, and that  monitoring  is part of the decision-making process. Accordingly, the 
managerial approach typically views decision-making and monitoring as complementary activities.  
In contrast, most of the supervisory-approach models examine how the intensity with which a 
board  monitors  the  CEO  impacts  upon  the  board’s  decision  to  retain  or  fire  him  (Hermalin  and 
Weisbach, 1998; Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Graziano and Luporini, 2003; Hermalin, 2005; Dominguez-
Martinez et al., 2008; Laux, 2008). According to this approach, as Dominguez-Martinez et al. (2008) 
emphasize, the board will not limit the CEO’s actions, since allowing the CEO free rein will enable the 
board to acquire a signal as to whether the CEO is a good or a bad type. Hence, according to the 
supervisory approach the board observes the CEO’s actions, and its main function is to evaluate the CEO 
based on these actions. 
We examine whether requests were made to receive further information or an update, because 
such  a  request  is  a  good  indicator  of  whether  the  board  is  an  active  monitor  (as  suggested  by  the 
managerial approach) or a passive one (as implied by the supervisory approach). As detailed in Table 4, 
on firm level, boards of a given firm requested to receive further information or an update in 8% of the 
cases. The spread across firms was rather large, ranging from 1% to 21%. Panel 1 of Table 8, which 
aggregates all cases, indicates that on average boards requested to receive further information or an 
update in 11% of the cases. However, it should be noted that not all information requested by directors 
was necessarily provided to them. It is not possible to know exactly how often the directors received the 
information they requested, since such information is often provided outside the boardroom.   19
The following example demonstrates how a board can monitor actively by requesting further 
information. In two large firms the board was requested to approve an early retirement plan pertaining to a 
substantial number of employees. The plan entailed heavy costs for both firms. In the first firm, the CEO 
reminded the board that it had discussed the issue two years earlier and, at that time, had approved the 
early retirement of a large number of employees (yet, many directors had changed since the discussion the 
CEO  was  referring  to  had  taken  place).  The  CEO  explained  that  the  current  request  was  within  the 
framework of what had been discussed and approved by the board at that time. A director asked what 
where the costs of hiring new employees compared to the existing alternative. The CEO replied that the 
new  employees will  cost  less than  the  current  ones, and reported a  figure  that summarized  the  costs 
entailed by the plan. However, he did not explain what assumptions were made when calculating this 
figure, and which costs were included and which were left out. Nevertheless, the information provided by 
the CEO was sufficient for the board to approve the CEO’s request rather immediately. 
In the second firm in which the CEO requested that the board approve a similar request, the 
directors also asked what costs the early retirement program entails. The CEO provided the board with 
detailed figures regarding the different costs associated with the program, including direct and indirect 
costs. Nevertheless, the board wanted to receive additional information regarding the specific criteria, 
which would be used to determine which employees would be entitled to retire early, and from which 
specific professions the company was planning to hire new employees in place of those that would retire. 
Only after the board received this information at the following meeting, and discussed the information 
provided, did it approve the CEO’s request. 
6.2. Taking an Initiative 
A basic difference between the managerial and the supervisory approach concerns the activity of the 
board, and the way in which they take initiative to perform tasks they are not specifically requested to do. 
The managerial approach views boards as active decision makers, suggesting that they take initiatives to 
help them make decisions better. In contrast, the supervisory approach predicts that boards only passively   20
observe  the  decisions  made  by  the  CEO,  and  that  they  are  not  actively  involved  in  making  these 
decisions. 
To study the tendency of boards to make their own active contribution, we examine how often 
initiatives  were  taken  by  the  boards  in  our  sample.  We  break  down  these  initiatives  into  “minor 
initiatives” which are situations in which the board slightly modified the CEO’s original proposal, and 
“major initiatives” in which the board took an active part in defining the steps/ actions that should be 
taken. 
To illustrate the kind of activity that we classified as a major initiative consider the following 
example: One of the companies examined provided a substantial number of cars to their employees (as 
part of the compensation the employees received). The board was requested to approve the firm’s policy 
as to which employees were eligible to receive a car. One director encouraged the board to thoroughly 
examine  this issue: during two  meetings the board examined  carefully who was  entitled  to  receive  a 
vehicle, which type of vehicle employees of different rank were entitled to receive and how the firm’s 
policy  compared  to  that  of  other  companies.  Following  this  examination,  the  board  formulated  and 
approved a new policy on this issue, which was implemented by the firm.  
As presented in Table 4, on firm level, boards took a minor initiative or a major initiative in 
4.7% and 3.4% of the cases, respectively. Panel 2 of Table 8, which presents the aggregate number of 
cases in which boards took an initiative, indicates that the boards examined took a minor or a major 
initiative in 5.1% and 4.2% of the topic-subjects discussed, respectively, indicating that in 9.3% of the 
cases boards took some kind of an initiative. 
Furthermore, we examine as an indication of the activeness of the board, the percentage of 
cases in which the board either did not vote in line with the CEO, requested to receive further information 
or an update, or took an initiative (a minor or a major one). This percentage equals 19.2% of all issues in 
the sample. Moreover, given that there are a number of issues discussed in each meeting, in 252 or the 
402  meetings (63%), at least one of the  three  above-mentioned  actions were  taken. This  calculation 
suggests that when boards meet, they usually take some kind of action at some point during the meeting.    21
We also find that different kinds of actions tend to occur at the same time, suggesting that 
boards are more likely to take them when there is a particular issue the board is concerned with. As is 
evident  from  Table  8,  for  the  type  of  topic-subjects  for  which  boards  requested  to  receive  further 
information or an update, they also tended to take a minor or a major initiative. On the topic-subject level, 
the Pearson correlation between the percentage of cases boards requested to receive further information 
or  an  update,  and  those  for  which  they  took  an  initiative  equaled  0.46  (p<0.05,  n=23).  This  high 
correlation indicates that with respect to the issues for which boards were active, their activeness was 
likely to come in more than one form.  
In addition, Table 8 documents that the most common topic-subjects for which requests for 
further information or an update were made and initiatives taken are audit, contracting/purchase, and 
personnel and benefits. Examples of cases that were categorized under these topic-subjects include a 
board  that  was  requested  to  approve  that  the  firm  hire  a  specific  professional  consulting  company 
(contracting/ purchase), or that the firm hire a specific deputy recommended by the CEO (personnel and 
benefits). This pattern implies that the boards in our sample tended to exert effort with respect to the 
supervisory  issues  rather  than  the  managerial  ones.  The  fact  that  their  activeness  was  focused  on 
supervisory issues provides further evidence for the supervisory approach. Nevertheless, the activeness 
and  initiation  of  boards  also  demonstrates  that  boards  are  not  passive  observers  as  the  supervisory 
approach suggests, rather, they are active, as implied by the managerial approach.  
 
7.  The Dynamics Among Directors 
7.1. Dissension 
Merchant and Pick (2010), Leblanc and Gillies (2005), and many practitioners argue that an effective 
board meeting should involve disagreement among the directors, at least when an issue is initially brought 
up  for  discussion,  because  this  encourages  critical  thinking.  A  board  in  which  matters  are  routinely 
approved without discussion is thought not to be providing much value to the firm. Nevertheless, Leblanc   22
and Gillies (2005) argue that it is desirable that at the voting phase the board reach a consensus, i.e., it 
votes unanimously.  
  Many  of  the  models  examining  the  work  of  boards  (both  from  the  managerial  and  the 
supervisory approach) do not emphasize dynamics within the boardroom, instead assuming the board is 
monolithic  and  makes  a  group  decision  around  a  set  of  “board  preferences”  (e.g.,  Hermalin  and 
Weisbach, 1998; Song and Thakor, 2006; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Laux and Laux, 2008; Levit, 2011). 
Evaluation of the extent to which this assumption is accurate, or whether models focusing on interactions 
between directors  are  more  appropriate, requires  knowledge  of what  goes  on inside the boardroom, 
stressing the importance of the use of data such as we have here.  
  Other  models,  including  Warther  (1998),  Chemmanur  and  Fedaseyeu  (2010)  and  Malenko 
(2011), focus on the interactions between directors who have differing opinions or information. The 
Warther (1998) model suggests that if a director creates dissention by indicating that the CEO is of low 
quality or the project he proposes is of low quality, he can be ejected from the board or “punished”. In 
equilibrium  directors  attempt  to  avoid  dissension  and  to  vote  unanimously.  In  Chemmanur  and 
Fedaseyeu (2010), dissension and coordination costs can lead boards not to vote for the optimal option. 
Malenko (2011) stresses that to avoid dissension, directors will make an effort to communicate with one 
another at the pre-voting phase. Consequently, similarly to Warther (1998), the model implies that votes 
will mostly be unanimous.  
  In our sample, Table 4 documents that weighted by firm, the board did not vote unanimously in 
only 3.3% of the cases. If we instead count each meeting equally in our weighting, the numbers are 
similar; Panel 2 of Table 7 documents that in only 2.5% of the 1422 cases in which decisions were made 
by the board, the votes were not unanimous. As in the Malenko (2011) model, the minutes document that 
dissension was common at the pre-voting phase. However, at the voting phase, even if the minutes made 
clear that the discussion did not conclude with directors completely agreeing with each other, in many 
cases the directors with the minority opinion voted with the majority anyway.    23
From Table 7 it is evident that on relatively controversial subjects (e.g., personnel and benefits, 
as opposed to business issues) on which boards did not vote in line with the CEO, they were also likely 
to disagree with each other. The Pearson correlation between the aggregate topic-subjects on which 
boards did not vote in line with the CEO on the hand, and those in which they did not vote unanimously 
equals 0.89 (p<0.05, n=5), and on the topic subject level 0.571 (p<.001, n=23). This pattern indicates that 
disagreement (between the board and the CEO) and dissension (among directors) are likely to occur or 
not to occur depending on the type of issue that is discussed.  
In sum, the low rates of dissension indicate that at least at the voting phase, directors tend not 
to dissent from their peers’ opinions. This pattern is consistent with models in which the board is an 
entity with a single opinion, and also with models such as Warther (1998), Chemmanur and Fedaseyeu 
(2010) and Malenko (2011), in which in equilibrium votes will be unanimous. 
7.2. The Impact of Board Size on Actions Boards Take 
Harris and Raviv (2008) and Chemmanur and Fedaseyeu (2011) both argue that larger boards 
have both costs and benefits; while larger boards have cumulatively more knowledge and expertise, each 
of  the directors  is likely  to  exert  less  effort because  of  free riding among directors.  In Table 9 we 
estimate the way in which the number of directors in attendance at a particular meeting affects the 
directors’ actions at that meeting.  We estimate models predicting the actions of the board that we can 
observe: whether they took an initiative (e.g., proposed which action should be taken), requested to 
receive further information or an update, did not vote in line with the CEO, or did not vote unanimously. 
Because these dependent variables are all binary, we estimate our equations using logistic specifications. 
  In these equations, we include the number of directors attending the particular meeting as our 
primary  independent  variable.    In  addition,  we  include  into  the  equation  the  proportion/number  of 
attending women directors, the proportion/number of attending outside directors, and the average number 
of years of executive experience of the attending directors, the proportion of attending directors with an 
MA/MBA, whether the firm had a serving CEO at the time the issue was discussed, and whether the 
issue was discussed at a board meeting, as opposed to a board meeting.   24
  Table  9  presents  estimates  of  these  equations.  The  results  indicate  that  larger  boards  are 
generally associated with more cumulative effort. However, these boards are also likely to encounter 
different types of disagreement. More specifically, larger boards are more likely to request an update, but 
also likely to disagree with the CEO, and also with each other. The estimates imply that an additional 
attending  director  increased  the  likelihood  that  disagreement  or  dissension  occur  by  20%  and  28%, 
respectively. These findings suggest that larger boards monitor, cumulatively, more intensively (in line 
with  the  analysis  of  Harris  and  Raviv,  2008,  and  Chemmanur  and  Fedaseyeu,  2011),  but  that 
coordination becomes more difficult as board size increases, consistent with Raheja (2005), Malenko 
(2011), and Chemmanur and Fedaseyeu (2011). Larger boards can induce more effort, however, their 
efforts do not necessarily lead to more productive outcomes.  
 
8.  Summary and Conclusions 
Boards  of  directors  play  a  central  role  in  corporate  governance.  Yet,  the  way  in  which  they  make 
decisions is a mystery. Their discussions are conducted behind closed doors, and records of who said 
what, or even the general tenor of the meeting, is generally not publicly available. Empirical studies of 
governance generally draw inferences about the roles of the board from publicly available data, and it is 
often difficult to know whether these inferences are correct. Because of the uncertainty about how boards 
actually operate, scholars have used wildly different assumptions when modeling boards of directors. 
  In this paper, we construct a database consisting of the actual board minutes of a sample of eleven 
Israeli, government-controlled companies for one year per company. These minutes contain details of who 
said what at board meetings and board committee meetings, the actions taken by the directors, and whether 
dissent among directors and disagreement between the directors and the CEO occurred. We characterize 
the interaction among directors and between them and the CEO, and illustrate the way in which directors 
make decisions. Our goal is to evaluate to understand the extent to which models of boards of directors 
correspond to real-world practice.   25
The results suggest that most of the time, boards play a supervisory role. In our sample, boards 
usually  discussed  issues  we  classify  as  supervisory,  were  more  likely  to  receive  updates  than  make 
decision, were not presented with alternatives, and almost always voted in line with the CEO. However, 
we also find evidence suggesting that some of the time they play a managerial role as well. In 63% of the 
meetings, boards took some kind of action; on firm level, they actively requested further information on 
8% of the issues discussed; and they took initiatives on their own in 8.1% of the issues. However, most of 
the board’s activeness was directed to supervisory issues. Taken together, our findings suggest that boards 
could  be  characterized  as  “active  monitors”  –  boards  are  active,  but  their  focus  is  on  supervising 
management rather than dictating the specifics of how the company should be run. 
We  emphasize  that there  are important limitations  of  this  study. The sample consists  of  only 
eleven companies, from one small country, for only one year per company. Equally important, most of 
them are government-controlled companies rather than privately-held ones. Consequently, directors are 
appointed rather than elected, and their pecuniary incentives are typically smaller than in privately-held 
companies. It is possible that these factors lead the interactions we observe in our sample of companies to 
be  different  from  those  in  companies  that  are  more  representative  of  the  population  of  worldwide 
corporations. In particular, we would expect that the existence of monetary incentives as directors receive 
in most privately-held companies are likely to lead boards to more active than we observe in our sample. 
These potential differences between our sample firms and other firms notwithstanding, we believe 
this analysis constitutes an important step in our understanding of boards of directors. A key step to 
understanding corporate governance is to observe exactly what goes on in boardrooms. This paper is the 
first to document in any systematic fashion what boards actually do. The extent to which the sample of 
Israeli, government-controlled companies’ boards is reflective of boards of non-Israeli, non-government-
controlled companies is unclear. Hopefully future research will be able to perform similar analyses for 
other  samples  of  companies,  and  determine  the  extent  to  which  boardroom  dynamics  differ  across 
different types of companies, or follow a more or less universal pattern. 
   26
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Table 1 
Business Companies in which the Israeli Government Holds Shares (GBCs) 
This table presents 2007 figures for all firms engaged in business activities in which the Israeli government held 
shares that year. The data were taken from annual reports of the GCA.  
 








in 2007  field 
percentage 




1  A.T. Communication Channels  940  8  Transportation and Communication  100% 
2  Agrexco Agricultural Export Co. Ltd.  868,460  365  Agriculture  50% 
3  Arim Urban Development Ltd.  13,040  28  Building, housing and Development  100% 
4  Ashdod Port Company Ltd.  263,670  1,275  Transportation and Communication  100% 
5  Ashot-Ashkelon Industries Ltd.  56,120  399  Defense  88% 
6  Ashra the Israel Export Insurance Corporation  12,440  18  Industry and Commerce  100% 
7  Atarim Tourist Development Corp. Tel Aviv Jaffa Ltd.  6,140  23  Industry and Commerce  50% 
8  E.M.S. Ltd.  83,130  NA  Electricity and Water  100% 
9  Eilat Port Company Ltd.  27,380  112  Transportation and Communication  100% 
10  Elta Systems Ltd.  918,750  3,407  Defense  100% 
11  Haifa Port Company Ltd.  210,950  1,064  Transportation and Communication  100% 
12  Industrial Development Bank of Israel Ltd.  26,580  43  Industry and Commerce  49% 
13  Insurance Fund for Natural Risks in Agriculture Ltd.  46,000  69  Agriculture  50% 
14  Isorad Ltd.  12,250  20  Industry and Commerce  100% 
15  Israel Aircraft Industries  3,292,110  12,939  Defense  100% 
16  Israel Bank of Agriculture  9,780  25  Agriculture  92% 
17  Israel Government Coins and Medals Corporation Ltd.  4,560  39  Industry and Commerce  100% 
18  Israel Military Industries Ltd.  571,440  2,966  Defense  100% 
19  Israel Natural Gas Lines Company Ltd.   7,970  69  Energy and Petroleum  100% 
20  Israel Ports Development and Assets Company Ltd.  172,030  105  Transportation and Communication  100% 
21  Israel Postal Company Ltd.  421,930  4,860  Transportation and Communication  100% 
22  Israel Railways Ltd.  222,770  2,107  Transportation and Communication  100% 
23  Life Science Research Israel Ltd.  4,820  47  Industry and Commerce  100% 
24  Matz - The Israel National Roads Company Ltd.  606,470  296  Industry and Commerce  100% 
25  Mekorot Water Co. Ltd.  708,070  2,211  Electricity and Water  100% 
26  Oil Products Pipeline Ltd.  20,050  0  Energy and Petroleum  100% 
27  Petroleum and Energy Infrastructures Ltd.  75,750  383  Energy and Petroleum  100% 
28  Pi-Gliloth Petroleum Terminals and Pipelines Ltd.  9,990  76  Energy and Petroleum  50% 
29  Postal Bank Company Ltd.  NA  0  Transportation and Communication  100% 
30  Rafael Advanced Defense Systems  1,286,160  5,213  Defense  100% 
31  Rotem Industries Ltd.  14,890  95  Industry and Commerce  100% 
32  The Israel Electric Corporation Ltd.  4,689,390  12,212  Electricity and Water  100% 
33  The Marine Trust Ltd.  6,240  8  Building, Housing and Development  50% 
34  The National Coal Supply Corporation Ltd.   1,069,140  26  Electricity and Water  99% 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics on Boards Examined and Other Boards 
This table presents summary statistics on the background of the directors serving on the boards of the eleven GBCs 
for which minutes were examined, and for several other types of boards. “NA” indicates that data is not available.  
 










age  50.0  57.6  52.3  56.5  62.1 
have bachelor degree  96%  87%  50%  87%  NA 
have an MBA/MA degree  48%  79%  52%  85%  NA 
percent with executive experience*  58%  91%  50%  18%  62% 
served or are serving on other boards  44%  NA  NA  NA  NA 
     of these: non gvt./non-NGO boards  21%  NA  NA  NA  NA 
currently serving on a board of a listed firm  NA  18%  19%  31%  21%** 
average number of directors  8.4  NA  5.3  8.0  10.7 
median number of annual board meetings  12.0  NA  NA  NA  8.0 
year examined  2008  2009  2009  2003  2010 
number of companies examined  11  100  113  269  500 















* As a rule, in most studies executive experience was defined as one of the following positions: CEO, an executive 
position in an organization - e.g., head of a functional unit, partner/principal, or vice president. However definitions 
vary across studies, and therefore this variable is informative only to a limited extent.  
** Figure from Peterson and Philpot (2007), pertains to Fortune 500 boards from 2002. 
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Table 3  
Comparison of Models Examining the Working of Boards  
Panel 1 – Managerial-approach models. This panel presents the managerial models, which generally assume that boards make decisions concerning the actual 
business of the firm.  
 
   Song and Thakor 
(2006) 
Adams and Ferreira 
(2007) 




Levit (2011)  Malenko (2011) 
1. Managerial or 
supervisory approach 
managerial  managerial  managerial  managerial  managerial  managerial 
2. Is monitoring the 
boards’ main role? 
yes  no  no  no  no  no 
3. Is disagreement 
between the board and 
the CEO expected? 
possible  yes, frequently  yes, frequently  yes  yes  yes 
4. Is the board 
monolithic? 
yes  yes  yes  no  yes  no 
5. Do boards make 
business decisions? 
mostly  yes  yes  yes  very likely  very likely 
6. Do boards choose 
from several options? 
only one at a 
time 
yes  yes, the scale of an 
investments 
yes, an optimal 
action 
possibly  possibly 




interfering in the 
project selection 
acquiring information 
at cost, choosing scale 
of investment 
choosing an 




cost, make a 
decision  
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Panel 2 – Supervisory-approach models. The supervisory approach generally presumes that the board’s role is assessing the CEO’s performance and deciding 
whether to retain him. 
 


























1. Managerial or 
supervisory approach 
supervisory  supervisory  supervisory  supervisory  mostly 
supervisory 




2. Is monitoring the boards’ 
main role? 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
3. Is disagreement between 
the board and the CEO 
expected? 





no  no  yes, in one 
scenario 
no 
4. Is the board monolithic?  yes  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  no 
5. Do boards make business 
decisions? 




no  no  not regularly, 




not in the 
basic model  
6. Do boards choose from 
several options? 
no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics on Board Dynamics 
This table presents firm-level statistics for the variables that document the board dynamics at board meetings and 
board-committee meetings for the eleven GBCs examined. In each column, N is the cumulative number of all cases 
examined, which aggregate to 2459 decisions and updates, or to 1422 decisions, depending on the variable. The 
variables in this table are calculated by first computing the average of the relevant variable for each firm, and then 
computing the equally-weighted average across the 11 firms. The variables, presented in the top row, present the 
percentage of cases in which the board (from left to right): discussed a supervisory issue as opposed to a managerial 
one; received an update as opposed to making a decision; was presented with at least two alternatives; requested to 
receive further information or an update; did not vote in line or voted only partially in line with the CEO’s proposal; 
did not vote unanimously; took a minor initiative (the board slightly modified the original proposal); or took a major 























average  66.9%  60.8%  1.0%  8.0%  2.5%  3.3%  4.7%  3.4% 
median  69.9%  57.0%  0.0%  5.4%  2.6%  1.2%  4.5%  3.0% 
minimum  44.7%  42.1%  0.0%  1.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
maximum  88.1%  76.8%  4.6%  21.1%  7.9%  18.8%  10.9%  7.7% 
S.D.  11.9%  12.9%  1.4%  6.7%  2.2%  5.4%  3.2%  2.5% 






Supervisory versus Managerial issues Discussed by the Boards 
This table categorizes the 2459 topic-subjects discussed at board meetings and board-committee meetings of the 
eleven  GBCs  examined,  broken  down  according  to  whether  they  were  of  supervisory  or  managerial  nature. 
Supervisory topic-subjects were defined as: appointment of members, approving minutes of earlier meetings, audit, 
choosing a chairman for the meeting, contracting/purchases, financial reports, formal issues, legal, personnel and 
benefits,  ratification  of  audit  committee,  ratification  of  human  resources  committee,  ratification  of  operational 
committee,  ratification  of  financial  committee,  and  regulation  and  government.  Managerial  topic-subjects  were 
defined  as:  appointing/firing  an  executive,  budget,  business  issue,  business  project,  cross-firm  issues, 
investment/finance, ongoing general issues, organizational change, and strategic issues. 
 
At what kind of meeting was the 





Board  60%  40%  100%  1,313 
board-committee  79%  21%  100%  1,146 
total number of cases examined  1,696  763  2459 
percentage of total  69%  31%  100%    
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Table 6 
Issues Discussed by the Board 
This table presents the percentage of cases in which each aggregate topic-subject was discussed, out of the 2459 
cases in which the boards of the eleven GBCs examined received an update or made a decision at a board meeting 
or a board-committee meeting. The table also provides a breakdown of the percentage of updates given versus the 
percentage of decisions made, on a topic-subject level; That is, for each topic-subject the percentage of cases in 
which the board was provided with an update, as opposed to the percentage of the cases in which the board made a 
decision.  
 




percent of all 
topic-subjects 
discussed     
percent of 
topic-subject 







audit and contracting   685  28%  48%  52% 
business issue   587  24%  67%  33% 
financial issues   363  15%  39%  61% 
formal issues   361  15%  4%  96% 
personnel and benefits   463  19%  33%  67% 
Percent  100%  58%  42% 






This table reports the 1422 cases in which the boards of the eleven GBCs examined made a decision in a board 
meeting or a board-committee meeting, broken down on the aggregate topic-subject level. The table reports whether 
the decision made by the board was either not in line or only partially in line with the CEO’s initial proposal, and 
the percentage of cases in which boards voted unanimously. Cases in which one or more director did not vote as the 




percent of cases 
vote not in line or 
partially in line 
with CEO 
percent of 




audit and contracting   2.0%  2.3%  354 
business issue   1.0%  2.6%  192 
financial issues   4.5%  4.1%  221 
formal issues   0.6%  0.3%  347 
personnel and benefits   4.5%  4.2%  308 
Total  2.5%  2.5%  1422 
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Table 8 
The Extent Boards were Active 
This table reports the 2459 cases in which the boards of the eleven GBCs examined received an update or made a 
decision in a board meeting or a board-committee meeting, broken down by the topic-subject discussed. Panel 1 
reports the percentage of cases in which boards requested to receive further information or an update. Panel 2 
reports whether the boards took no initiative, a minor initiative, or a major initiative. “Minor initiative” is defined as 
a case in which the board slightly modified the original proposal. “Major initiative” is defined as a case in which the 
board took an active part in defining the steps/actions that should be taken. “No initiative” refers to all cases in 
which neither a minor initiative nor a major one was taken.  
 
         Panel 1     Panel 2       
aggregate 
topic-






















of cases  
audit and 
contracting 
Audit  26%  71  8%  9%  45  273 
contracting/purchases  14%  45  7%  2%  28  319 
Legal  9%  8  7%  2%  8  85 
ratification audit committee  0%  0  0%  0%  0  8 
audit and contracting total    18%  123  7%  5%  81  685 
business 
`issue 
business issue  4%  2  0%  2%  1  50 
business project  14%  24  7%  2%  15  174 
cross-firm issues  21%  16  7%  10%  13  77 
ongoing general issues  5%  7  0%  0%  0  135 
ratification operational committee  0%  0  11%  0%  1  9 
regulation and government  9%  11  4%  3%  9  127 
strategic issues  27%  4  13%  7%  3  15 
business issue total    11%  65  4%  3%  42  587 
financial 
issues 
budget  17%  18  6%  4%  10  106 
financial reports  16%  20  9%  6%  19  128 
investment/finance  8%  9  8%  0%  9  118 
ratification of financial committee  0%  0  0%  0%  0  11 
financial issues total    13%  47  7%  3%  38  363 
formal 
issues 
approving past minutes  0%  0  0%  0%  0  191 
choosing chairman for meeting  0%  0  0%  0%  0  38 
formal issues  0%  0  0%  1%  1  70 
appointment of members  0%  0  2%  5%  4  62 
formal issues total   0%  0  0%  1%  5  361 
personnel 
and benefits 
appointing/firing executive  0%  0  9%  28%  25  68 
organizational change  5%  1  0%  10%  2  20 
personnel and benefits  11%  38  5%  5%  36  345 
ratification of HR committee  0%  0  0%  0%  0  30 
personnel and benefits total   9%  42  5%  8%  63  463 
Total     11.0%  270    5%  4%  228    2459 
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Table 9 
Size of Board and Actions Boards Take 
This table presents logistic regressions analyzing the likelihood that the boards of the eleven GBCs examined take an initiative (e.g., suggested which action 
should be taken), request to receive further information or an update, completely or partially not vote in line with the CEO’s proposal, and not vote unanimously. 
For each variable, the first line presents coefficients, and the second line presents robust clustered errors on firm level (in parentheses). ***, **, *, indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 level, respectively. 
 





















(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
number of directors in 
attendance 
  -.016  .050  .052  .181***  .164***  .248***  .271***  .087 
  (.030)  (.032)  (.035)  (.065)  (.025)  (.091)  (.052)  (.134) 
proportion of women 
directors 
  .329    .706    .216    .115   
  (.465)    (.437)    (.397)    1.459   
proportion of outside 
directors 
-.958***  -.1.477***  -1.157**    1.229   
  (.314)    (.466)    (.500)    (.752)   
number of women 
directors 
    .094    .117    .018    .016 
    (.094)    (.093)    (.105)    (.212) 
number of outside 
directors 
    -.1507***    -.255***    -.122    .274 
    (.050)    (.080)    (.106)    (.183) 
average proportion 
executive experience 
  .050**  .033*  0.082***  .063**  .100***  .080**  -.039  -.039 
  (.021)  (.018)  (.024)  (.025)  (.033)  (.038)  (.057)  (.057) 
average proportion MA 
.154  .152  .315  .378  .325  .544  1.934**  2.451* 
  (.212)  (.270)  (.525)  (.590)  (.842)  (.861)  (.912)  (1.257) 
no serving CEO 
.670***  .638***  .131  .084  -.430  -.490  -.599  -.562 
  (.191)  (.209)  (.363)  (.392)  (.350)  (.373)  (.445)  (.472) 
was board meeting 
-.555*  -.563*  -1.259***  -1.307***  -1.463***  -1.486***  .015  .022 
  (.324)  (.321)  (.269)  (.276)  (.300)  (.299)  (.461)  (.417) 
decisions and updates    yes  yes  yes  yes  only decisions  only decisions  only decisions  only decisions 
number of observations    2,459  2,459  2,459  2,459  1,422  1,422  1,422  1,422 
pseudo R 2    .031  .029  .0726  .069  .102  .0977  .122  .128 
significance     .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000   38
 
Appendix: Complete Coding Guidelines  
The data was coded according to the content-analysis methodology (Krippendorff, 2004; Lieblich et al., 
1998),  which  allows  the  transformation  of  qualitative  data  into  quantitative  figures.  The  following 
principles were applied in coding the data: 
xi.  General information. For each issue discussed, the coding included the name of the company, date 
of meeting, number of pages of minutes, type of meeting (board/ committee), and whether the issue 
was merely presented as an update or, alternatively, culminated in a decision made by the board. 
Board committees were further categorized as either: finance, human resource, audit, operational, 
regulation  or  contracting  committee.  In  certain  cases,  a  company  had  two  or  more  different 
committees categorized under the same board-committee category.  
xii.  Topic-subjects. Each topic discussed or decision made in a board or board-committee meeting, was 
coded under one of the following twenty-three topic-subjects:  
i.  Appointing/  firing  an  executive  –  executives  include  the  CEO,  his  deputies,  and  the 
auditor. 
ii.  Appointment of members – to board-committees or boards of subsidiary firms.  
iii.  Approving minutes of past meetings – formal approval of the minutes by the board.  
iv.  Audit – audit reports and audit issues regarding the firm. 
v.  Budget  –  updates,  suggested  changes,  and  projected  budget  are  included  under  this 
category.  
vi.  Business issue – a standard business issue. For instance, in the case of a bank, waiving 
part of a problematic debt would be coded under this category.  
vii.  Business  project  –  data  regarding  a  specific  project  the  firm  or  a  subsidiary  had 
undertaken or considered to undertake.   39
viii.  Choosing  a  chairman  for  the  meeting  –  companies  which  do  not  have  a  permanent 
chairman, elect a chairman for each board meeting.  
ix.  Contracting/ purchases – contracts  regarding purchasing  raw  materials,  supplies, real 
estate, or services, including those of advisors and external accountants. This category 
includes problems that may arise within contractual relationships.  
x.  Cross-firm issues – an issue with across-the-firm implications (for example: proposed 
changes in the customer service, or moving the offices to a new location), or the plans of 
a specific unit that have ramifications and implications for the firm at large.  
xi.  Financial reports – discussions regarding the financial reports and the assumptions upon 
which they rely.  
xii.  Formal  issues  –  issues  that  must  receive  the  formal  approval  of  the  board,  such  as 
granting the authority to sign a contract or financial reports, or to represent the firm in a 
general meeting.  
xiii.  Investment/  finance  –  issues  regarding  money  invested,  borrowed  from  banks  or  the 
government, or raised from institutional investors or the stock market, and also issues 
regarding the firm’s floating stock.  
xiv.  Legal – legal issues, including insurance.  
xv.  Ongoing general issues – ongoing continuing issues in the life of the firm, including brief 
anecdotal updates on issues previously discussed by the board. Note that most board 
meetings commenced with such brief updates presented by the CEO/ chairman. When, 
however, distinct issues were discussed in detail, each was coded separately. 
xvi.  Organizational change – structural changes in the firm.  
xvii.  Personnel  and  compensation  –  employee  benefits  (e.g.,  receiving  bonuses  or  leasing 
cars), behavioral problems among employees, changes in the total number of employees, 
general  policies  regarding  employees,  and  a  limited  range  of  issues  regarding 
compensation and benefits received by the board-members.   40
xviii.  Ratification of audit committee – In cases in which an issue discussed previously by a 
board committee was discussed again by the board, the discussion  on the board was 
coded under the relevant topic-subject. In cases in which the decision made by the board 
committee was only briefly presented, so as to allow the board to ratify the decision, the 
decision was coded under the relevant ratification topic-subject. “Ratification of audit 
committee” refers to ratification of decisions made by the audit board-committee. 
xix.  Ratification of financial committee – according to the rationale presented in paragraph xi, 
this pertains to ratifications of decisions made by the financial board-committee. 
xx.  Ratification  of  human  resources  committee  –  according  to  the  rationale  presented  in 
paragraph xi, this pertains to  ratifications  of decisions  made by the human  resources 
board-committee. 
xxi.  Ratification of operational committee – according to the rationale presented in paragraph 
x., this pertains to ratifications of decisions made by the operational board-committee. 
xxii.  Regulation and government – all aspects regarding the relationship with the government, 
whether as regulator, shareholder, or otherwise. Examples of issues included are fees 
determined by the regulator, dividends requested by the government, and privatization. 
xxiii.  Strategic issues – discussion regarding the strategic business plan of the firm, or at least 
of a major activity of the firm, for the following years.  
xiii.  Aggregate topic-subjects. In order to allow a simple and meaningful analysis, the 23 topic-subjects 
described above were divided into five aggregate topic-subjects as follows:  
i.  Audit and contracting – includes the topic-subjects: audit, contracting/ purchases, legal, 
and ratification of audit committee. 
ii.  Business issues – includes the topic-subjects: business issues, business projects, cross-
firm issues, ongoing general issues, ratification of operational committee, regulation and 
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iii.  Financial  issues  –  includes  the  topic-subjects:  budget,  financial  reports,  investment/ 
finance, and ratification of financial committee. 
iv.  Formal issues – includes the topic-subjects: appointments of members, approving past 
minutes of meetings, choosing a chairman for the meeting, and formal issues. 
v.  Personnel  and  benefits  –  includes  the  topic-subjects:  appointing/  firing  an  executive, 
organizational  change,  personnel  and  benefits,  and  ratification  of  human  resources 
committee.   
xiv.  Decision in line with CEO. For each decision made by the board, the decision was coded as either in 
line, partially in line, or not in line with the CEO’s/ management’s proposal.
 21 In cases in which the 
CEO’s/ management’s view was not presented, its view was coded as “neutral.” 
xv.  Further updates. Cases in which the board requested to receive further information or an update on 
the subject discussed. In cases in which concerning a single topic discussed, more than one update or 
further information was requested it was, nevertheless, coded as one request. 
xvi.  Taking  action.  When  a  board  actively  did  something  that  was  meant  to  improve  the  company, 
according  to  its  own  understanding,  this  was  coded  as  either  “minor  initiative”  or  as  “major 
initiative.”  
“Minor  initiative”  indicates  that  the  board  slightly  modified  the  original  proposal.  The 
following  three  examples  illustrate  which  cases  were  coded  under  this  category:  (i)  The  board 
approved a lease it was asked to approve, yet decided to introduce a few revisions of details; (ii) The 
board requested that some moderate action be taken, for instance, that the CEO write a letter to the 
regulator about an issue discussed at the board meeting; (iii) The board decided to form a committee 
to handle a certain issue, or to appoint someone to take care of it, but at the point of time this decision 
                                                  
21In cases in which the chairman received a monthly salary, and accordingly dedicated most of his time to the firm, 
it is generally evident from the minutes that, in the boardroom, his views were fully coordinated and aligned with 
those of the CEO. In these cases, the chairman usually complemented the CEO and vice versa. Accordingly, views 
of chairmen who receive monthly salaries were regarded and coded as identical to those of the CEO. In contrast, in 
firms in which the chairman was only compensated on a base of board/ committee meetings he attended, his views 
were not always coordinated and aligned with those of the CEO, and therefore, he was regarded as a board member, 
and his views were coded accordingly as views of the board.   42
was made it is, of course, impossible to know whether the committee or the individual appointed 
actually took any action.
22  
The second code, “major initiative”, indicates that the board took an active part in defining 
the steps/ actions that should be taken. The following two examples illustrate which cases were coded 
under this category: (i) A board delved into an issue presented to it, or into an issue it actively asked 
to discuss. For instance, if a board requested to examine the company’s policy concerning perks 
(including, for example, which employees were eligible to be driven to work, at what times and under 
what circumstances), then discussed the policy concerning that perk quite thoroughly, and finally, 
formulated and adopted a new alternative policy, that would be coded as “major initiative”; (ii) A 
board actively sought, both within the boardroom and elsewhere, to change the regulation imposed on 
the firm.
23 
xvii.  Interregnum. Cases in which the firm had no CEO at the time the board or board-committee meeting 
was held. 
xviii.  Presentation of alternatives. Cases in which the board was presented with at least two alternatives, 
including cases in which the CEO/ management made its own preference clear.  
xix.  Dissension. Cases in which a decision was made, and one or more of the board-members did not vote 
as the others (either opposing them or abstaining).  
xx.  Supervision. All topic-subjects were divided according to whether they were of supervisory nature or 
not.  Supervisory  topic-subjects  were  defined  as:  appointment  of  members,  approving  minutes  of 
earlier meetings, audit, choosing a chairman for the meeting, contracting/ purchases, financial reports, 
formal issues, legal, personnel and benefits, ratification of audit committee, ratification of human 
resources committee, ratification of operational committee, ratification of financial committee, and 
                                                  
22  If  the  minutes  of  subsequent  meetings  documented  that  they  did  take  a  major  initiative,  it  was  categorized 
accordingly for that subsequent meeting. 
23 One may argue that this specific coding category is one with a “soft” definition. Accordingly, great care was taken 
to assure that the coding be conducted according to consistent standards: after the coding was completed, apart from 
the  general  rechecking  of  all  of  the  coding,  the  coding  of  this  specific  category  was  carefully  re-examined 
throughout all minutes examined. 
   43
regulation and government. Non-supervisory topic-subjects were defined as: appointing/ firing an 
executive, budget, business issue, business project, cross-firm issues, investment/ finance, ongoing 
general issues, organizational change, and strategic issues. 
xxi.  Size of board and board composition. For  each  meeting,  the total number of  attending board-
members was coded, along with the number of attending women directors, minority (Arabs) directors, 
and inside directors.
24  
xxii.  Consistency.  General  note:  To  assure  consistent  standards  all  coding  was  executed  by  a 
single person – the author,
25 and was reviewed by the author at least twice.  
 
                                                  
24 As mentioned, inside directors were defined as government employees and firm employees. The GCA board-
representative was considered a government employee. 
25 This was also due to the confidentiality of the minutes, which were made available to the authors with the proviso 
that only she and her doctoral advisors would be allowed access to them.  
 